Under Section 482 Crpc High Court can quash Criminal Proceeding/ F.I.R. and it cannot be override
Table of Content:-
- Background of the case
- Issues Raised
- Statutory Provisions Involved
- Submissions of the Parties
- Judgment Analysis
- Conclusion
- Case Laws:-
- Dinesh Sharma and others vs. State of U.P. and others, [2017 (Suppl.) ADJ 613]
- V. Rao v. L.H.V. Prasad & Ors. [(2000) 3 SCC 693]Najmul Hasan and others vs. State of U.P. and others [2018 (7) ADJ 245]
- Jayrajsinh Digvijaysinh Rana Vs. The state of Gujarat and another [2012 CJ (SC) 896]
- Shiji @ Pappu and Ors. Vs. Radhika and another [2011 CJ (SC) 239]
Shiv Dayal Singh & ors vs State of U.P. [Case No. 6822/ 2017]
Background of the case
On 28th May 2011 the complainant solemnizes the marriage with petitioner No. 1 of the case. Thereafter. Their marital relationship becomes bitter and strained and as the consequence, the wife of petitioner no. 1 lodged an F.I.R. against the petitioners under section 498A, 323, and 504 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and section 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 in Lucknow Police Station. Upon lodging the F.I.R. the police investigate the case ad accordingly prepared and filed the charge sheet in the court before the magistrate. On 4th September 2016, the learned Magistrate after taking cognizance of the offence passed the impugned order.
By aggrieved from the impugned order of the learned magistrate the petitioners had filed the present petition under section 482 Crpc.
Issues Raised
Does the High Court have the power under section 482 of the Crpc to quash a non-compoundable offence?
Statutory provision Involved
- Section 323 of the Indian penal Code, 1860
“Whoever, except in the case provided for by section 334, voluntarily causes hurt, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.”
- Section 498 A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
“1[Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, “cruelty mean
(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman
(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand.]”
- Section 504 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
“Whoever intentionally insults, and thereby gives provocation to any person, intending or knowing it to be likely that such provocation will cause him to break the public peace, or to commit any other offence, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.”
- Section 3 of the Dowry prohibition Act, 1961
“Penalty for giving or taking dowry.-
(1) If any person, after the commencement of this Act, gives or takes or abets the giving or taking of dowry, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five years, and with the fine which shall not be less than fifteen thousand rupees or the amount of the value of such dowry, whichever is more:
Provided that the Court may, for adequate and special reasons to be recorded in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than five years.
* * * Explanation I omitted by Sec.2 w.e.f 2nd October, 1985
(2)Nothing in sub-section (1) shall apply to or, in relation to,-
Presents which are given at the time of a marriage to the bride (without nay demand having been made in that behalf):
Provided that such presents are entered in list maintained in accordance with rule made under this Act;
presents which are given at the time of marriage to the bridegroom (without any demand having been made in that behalf):
Provided that such presents are entered in a list maintained in accordance with rules made under this Act;
Provided further that where such presents are made by or on behalf of the bride or any person related to the bride, such presents are of a customary nature and the value thereof is not excessive having regard to the financial status of the person by whom, or on whose behalf, such presents are given.”
- Section 4 of the Dowry prohibition Act, 1961
“If any person demands directly or indirectly, from the parents or other relatives or guardian of a bride or bridegroom as the case may be, any dowry, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months but which may extend to two years and with fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees:
Provided that the Court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than six months.”
- Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Act, 1973
“Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.”
- Section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955
“Divorce by mutual consent. —
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act a petition for dissolution of marriage by a decree of divorce may be presented to the district court by both the parties to a marriage together, whether such marriage was solemnised before or after the commencement of the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 (68 of 1976)*, on the ground that they have been living separately for a period of one year or more, that they have not been able to live together and that they have mutually agreed that the marriage should be dissolved.
(2) On the motion of both the parties made not earlier than six months after the date of the presentation of the petition referred to in sub-section (1) and not later than eighteen months after the said date, if the petition is not withdrawn in the meantime, the court shall, on being satisfied, after hearing the parties and after making such inquiry as it thinks fit, that a marriage has been solemnised and that the averments in the petition are true, pass a decree of divorce declaring the marriage to be dissolved with effect from the date of the decree.]
(i) The period of 6 to 18 months provided in section 13B is a period of interregnum which is intended to give time and opportunity to the parties to reflect on their move. In this transitional period the parties or either of them may have second thoughts; Suman v. Surendra Kumar, AIR 2003 Raj 155.
(ii) The period of living separately for one year must be immediately preceding the presentation of petition. The expression ‘living separately’ connotes not living like husband and wife. It has no reference to the place of living. The parties may live under the same roof and yet they may not be living as husband and wife. The parties should have no desire to perform marital obligations; Sureshta Devi v. Om Prakash, AIR 1992 SC 1904.
(iii) The period of six to eighteen months time is given in divorce by mutual consent as to give time and opportunity to the parties to reflect on their move and seek advice from relations and friends. Mutual consent should continue till the divorce decree is passed. The court should be satisfied about the bona fides and consent of the parties. If there is no consent at the time of enquiry the court gets no jurisdiction to make a decree for divorce. If the court is held to have the power to make a decree solely based on the initial petition, it negates the whole idea of mutuality. There can be unilateral withdrawal of consent. Held, that since consent of the wife was obtained by fraud and wife was not willing to consent, there could be unilateral withdrawal, of consent; Sureshta Devi v. Om Prakash, AIR 1992 SC 1904.”
Submissions of the Parties
The contention of the petitioners
- It was submitted that the issue was between husband and wife and the F.I.R. was lodged in exaggeration.
- It was urged that during the pendency of the proceeding in the presence of the respectable person of the society, a compromise has been taken place between them and the copy of the compromise was annexed herewith.
- On the basis of the compromise both of them have been separated and a decree of divorce has also been passed by the Principal Judge of the Family Court Lucknow under section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 in (Smt. Khushbu Chauhan vs Shiv Dayal Singh).
- It was further submitted that the compromise deed submitted in the court was also verified by the sub-registrar.
The contention of the Respondent
- It was submitted that both the parties have settled their dispute amicably and there are no other grievances left with each other.
- Further, it was submitted that the respondent has been satisfied with the compromise deed and if the procedure has been quashed or set aside by the High Court at this stage then the respondent would have no objection.
Judgment Analysis
The court stated that the scope and ambit of the power provided under section 482 Crpc would be examined by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and by the Allahabad High Court. In Dinesh Sharma and others vs. State of U.P. and others, [2017 (Suppl.) ADJ 613] it was held that civil and matrimonial disputes as well as in criminal matters (which do not have a grave effect) can be quashed on the basis of the compromise.
Further in B.S. Joshi and others vs. the State of Haryana and others, [(2003) 4 SCC 675] the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that
“The special features in such matrimonial matters are evident. It becomes the duty of the Court to encourage genuine settlements of matrimonial disputes. (Para 12)
The observations made by this Court, though in a slightly different context, in G.V. Rao v. L.H.V. Prasad & Ors. [(2000) 3 SCC 693] are very apt for determining the approach required to be kept in view in matrimonial disputes by the courts, it was said that there has been an outburst of matrimonial disputes in recent times. Marriage is a sacred ceremony, the main purpose of which is to enable the young couple to settle down in life and live peacefully. But little matrimonial skirmishes suddenly erupt which often assume serious proportions resulting in commission of heinous crimes in which elders of the family are also involved with the result that those who could have counselled and brought about rapprochement are rendered helpless on their being arrayed as accused in the criminal case. There are many other reasons which need not be mentioned here for not encouraging matrimonial litigation so that the parties may ponder over their defaults and terminate their disputes amicably by mutual agreement instead of fighting it out in a court of law where it takes years and years to conclude and in that process the parties lose their “young” days in chasing their “cases” in different courts. (Para 13)
There is no doubt that the object of introducing Chapter XX-A containing Section 498-A in the Indian Penal Code was to prevent the torture of a woman by her husband or by relatives of her husband. Section 498-A was added with a view to punishing a husband and his relatives who harass or torture the wife to coerce her or her relatives to satisfy unlawful demands of dowry. The hypertechnical view would be counter productive and would act against interests of women and against the object for which this provision was added. There is every likelihood that non-exercise of inherent power to quash the proceedings to meet the ends of justice would prevent women from settling earlier. That is not the object of Chapter XXA of Indian Penal Code. (Para 14)”
Further in Najmul Hasan and others vs. State of U.P. and others [2018 (7) ADJ 245] it was held that
“Considering the compromise arrived at between the parties on 07.05.2018, as extracted above in paragraph 5 and the categorical stand of the opposite party No.3 before this Court, we are of the considered opinion that no useful purpose would be served in continuation of criminal proceedings in pursuance of the impugned First Information Report lodged by opposite party No.3. Accordingly, it would be appropriate, in the facts and circumstances of the case, to quash the impugned First Information Report as continuation of the proceedings of the First Information Report would be a futile exercise.(Para 15)
We, therefore, allow the writ petition and quash the proceedings of the First Information Report dated 14.09.2017, vide Case Crime No.0404 of 2017, under Sections 498-A, 323, 377, 506 of Indian Penal Code and Section of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 at Police Station Saadatganj, District Lucknow, lodged by Smt.Anjum Rizvi-the opposite party No.3. (Para 16)“
In Jayrajsinh Digvijaysinh Rana Vs. The state of Gujarat and another [2012 CJ (SC) 896] it was held that if the offence in non-compoundable under section 320 Crpc then also it can be quashed on the basis of compromise.
The Supreme Court in Shiji @ Pappu and Ors. Vs. Radhika and another [2011 CJ (SC) 239] has scrutinized the legal position of the compromise in the criminal matter by stating that if the matter is private in nature then on the basis of compromise proceedings can be quashed otherwise the continuation of the same will cause sheer abuse of the process of law.
Conclusion
The court after taking all the facts and circumstances into consideration held that it would be better to end the proceedings and other litigation between the parties. The court added that in the matrimonial disputes after the settlement between the parties the ulterior motive is bleak and therefore there is no benefit or it doesn’t serve any useful purpose to permit the proceedings against the applicants. And accordingly, the Allahabad High Court set aside the present proceedings.